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Political campaigning was once universally described as being technologically behind the 
curve. While many major retailers were developing sophisticated models for collecting and 
analysing the data of their customers, while NGOs were developing ways of delivering 
targeted messages, and while citizens were creating and sharing content, electoral political 
organisations languished in an era of non-interactive, mass communication (Webster, 2001). 
Incrementally this imbalance has been redressed over the last decade and a half, and US 
election campaigns have led the way in demonstrating how to integrate the tools and 
concepts of Web 2.0 into strategic communication (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). The revolution 
is not in the take up of Facebook and other social platforms as other works have explored; 
rather it is innovation in the backstage infrastructure where Kreiss sees the emergence of a 
new prototype for campaigning. It is backstage where data is collected, assembled and 
analysed in order for a strategy to be developed for strategic message dissemination, 
fundraising and media buying. It is the ebb and flow of innovations 2004-14 that this 
important work carefully documents. Whether the description of how technology becomes 
embedded and adapted to the service of the campaign as ‘prototype politics’ is useful is a 
moot and unimportant question, what is important is how Kreiss maps the process that 
embed and perpetuate innovation between parties across contests. 
One of Kreiss’ key observations is that innovation comes from outside of an organisation and 
is a process of transferring ideas and skills from other domains. Historical party network 
processes, which govern who an organisation can connect with, are thus deemed very 
important. The more insular an organisation is, relying purely on traditions of thinking and 
practice, the more it stagnates. Due to high levels of cognitive diversity the Democrats 
developed new thinking around campaigns. The critical shock of defeat led to innovation by 
the Republicans in the run up to the campaigns of 2000 and 2004, however the advantages 
were lost as Kerry’s 2004 defeat coupled with Dean’s achievements led the party to reform 
processes and build a team to innovate in time for 2008. Unlike their rivals, Democrats had 
access to a “liberal data analytics ecosystem” (p. 20) and the party had a culture permitting 
their expertise to be valued. The intellectual freedom and autonomy to innovate placed clear 
blue water between the Democrats and the Republicans, long term investment in technology 
permitted an ongoing advantage. 
The failure by Republicans to innovate is symbolic of the deeper structural problems the 
party has. Five chapters compare the structures of the parties and the impact on their 
electoral campaigns. The team around Bush-Cheney 2004 developed a model for crunching 
data, recruiting supporters and cross-platform campaigning capable of personalising 
messages that fed the ground campaign, but victory led to stasis. As Democrats invested 
and activated their “hybrid party network ecosystem” (p. 62), the Republican party placed the 
onus on individual candidates leading to a series of insular and unstable systems to be 
developed. As McCain’s defeat was seen as purely the result of socio-political factors there 
was no “desire for true innovation” in 2008 and the gap remained vast in 2012. The reasons 
Page 1 of 3
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/witp   Email: xenos@wisc.edu





























































For Peer Review Only
are that the Republican party undervalued technology so failed to invest or to develop a 
culture of innovation. The party also lacked an supportive ecosystem, rather innovation was 
nurtured by a liberal-progressive coalition (see also Karpf, 2012; Kreiss, 2012). These 
factors resulted in a less-developed infrastructure, either physical or technological with few 
staffers to develop the tools that facilitated strategic collection and use of data analytics. The 
failure to invest, coupled with Obama’s incumbency advantage, impeded progress for the 
party or Romney in 2012. From early in 2012 Obama re-energised his supporters launching 
an aggressive social media campaign to rebuild his base. Once activated, the campaign 
“asked supporters to become conduits of strategic campaign communication to their social 
ties” (p. 149). Analytics identified well-connected supporters and used them as credible 
advocates to target hard to reach citizens. The inefficiency and election day collapse of 
Romney’s ORCA data analytics system became symbolic of the imbalance in investments, 
infrastructure and resources between the parties. 
The launch of the Growth and Opportunity Project in the wake of the 2012 defeat has 
highlighted weaknesses in the areas of data capture and analytics. Any innovation in these 
areas could be crucial, particularly given that the Democrat party network is seen to be going 
through something of an existential crisis. Equally, Democrat advantages in 2014 did not 
stem the tide of opinion so there are a multitude of opportunities for both parties. As Kreiss 
notes, technological innovation is no more than a single contributory factor towards electoral 
success. Arguably the factor was not even a pivotal one. Oprah Winfrey and not Facebook 
was probably more responsible for making Obama a credible candidate in 2008, similarly ill-
advised remarks about the 48% who were written off by Romney may well have pushed 
some floating voters in key swing states into the Obama camp. Therefore one might ask why 
this book is important for understanding election campaigning and its effects in the US. 
Kreiss’ research details not only technological innovation, but also the party culture and 
infrastructure that facilitate putting in a strong electoral performance. Whether a party has a 
targeted strategy for using Facebook is immaterial, but if it does not it is indicative of the fact 
the party is out of touch with the modern media environment and is standing outside of the 
political ecosystem where they may interact with and learn from consultants, experts, 
enthusiastic amateurs and the everyday folk. In other words we find that being networked 
facilitates innovation that can contribute to victory, lacking a network leads to stasis and 
insularity which can lead to a multitude of forms of errors in strategizing and implementing 
election communication. Whether it be harnessing support online or harnessing support 
through a campaign on the doorsteps, the party needs an infrastructure and a network. It is 
in these crucial areas that the Republican party has failed over recent contests.  
The story of the 2016 campaign infrastructures is yet to be told. The campaigns front ends 
are highly traditional, seeking sign-ups, promoting their candidate and attacking the 
opponent. All candidates have a presence across social media, largely appearing to 
broadcast their messages into their respective ecosystems. To what extent these are built 
upon data analytics is a question for to raise to experts in the aftermath. The candidates are 
converting some supporters into “stewards of their own networked wards” (p. 219), 
extending the reach of campaigns to some extent, whether either campaign has a culture in 
which innovation is thriving is a bigger question. But this returns to an extent to the question 
of whether it matters. Despite sophisticated analytics, is it possible for communication to 
break out of a partisan ecosystem and reach the politically uninterested, mobilise the 
typically non-voting citizens and engage them with the campaigns. Do innovations, or even 
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the cultures within party organisations, matter or is it legacy media narratives which 
determine election outcomes. It is not the intention of this book to raise those issues, 
however they are very important for considering how technological innovation is impacting 
not just on the election campaigns of candidates but also on the democratic engagement of 
citizens and the democratic institutions of a nation. The book demonstrates one party to be 
more insular the other more open, perhaps reflecting an ideological schism. But is this a 
permanent schism or was Democrat party culture at this crucial time spearheaded by Dean 
as chair 2005-9, Obama as incumbent from 2008 and through the 2012 contest. In other 
words is a culture of innovation the preserve of the liberal progressive political schema or will 
we see ebb and flow across parties as we move forward. This maybe the next story for 
Kreiss to tell, and it would be welcomed, as well as research on how technological 
innovations contribute precisely to election outcomes. This book offers significant insights 
into internal machinations which shape culture and electoral contests as well as mapping 
research processes (in a rich Appendix) and is of significant value for understanding how 
parties approach electoral contests, implement strategies of innovation and so how they 
attempt to build support. 
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